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I. INTRODUCTION
While the Florida Legislature has made no significant or earth
shattering modification to the Florida Evidence Code in 1993, there have
been at least two recent evidentiary cases which the trial practitioner should
find important. This article will review these two cases and examine their
impact upon the trial lawyer.

II. THE EROSION OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION:
LOVE V. GARCIA'
On April 3, 1986, sometime after 11:00 p.m., a woman was walking
along Sunset Strip in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.' The woman, who was
wearing dark clothing, was spotted by a City of Sunrise Police Officer who,
after being flagged down by the woman, drove up along side of her. The
woman, who was noticeably upset and appeared to have been crying,
requested that the police officer give her a ride to a local gas station from
where she could make a telephone call. The police officer obliged and
dropped her off at the station.3
Shortly after being dropped off at the gas station, the woman was seen
walking in the median strip near the intersection of University Drive and
Sunset Strip by another pedestrian. The pedestrian noted that the woman
had hesitated in the median and then began to cross the intersection against
the red light.4
At the same time, an orthopedic surgeon was travelling along
University Drive on his way home from the hospital. Upon seeing the
doctor's vehicle approaching, the pedestrian shouted to the woman in an
attempt to warn her of the oncoming vehicle. When he yelled to her, the

1. 611 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla.

1993).
2. Initial Brief of Appellant at 3, Love (No. 89-3259).
3. Id.

4. Id.at 4.
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woman looked at him, put her head down, and continued walking into the
intersection.' Needless to say, the woman was struck by the doctor's
vehicle and suffered significant and extensive injuries.' She required more
than seven weeks of hospitalization, including more than two weeks of
intensive care, as well as several surgeries.'
On September 23, 1986, the woman, Luz Maria Garcia Rennes, filed
a complaint against the doctor, Douglas J.Love. Rennes claimed the doctor
negligently operated his automobile causing it to strike her, resulting in her
injuries and damages.' The doctor's key defense was that the woman was
intoxicated at the time of the accident, and that her intoxication caused or
contributed to her injuries.9
To support his defense, the doctor sought to introduce the results of
two blood alcohol tests which suggested the woman was intoxicated."0 The
first blood alcohol test was taken at the request of the police officer who
accompanied the woman to the hospital; it was taken shortly after the
accident and was analyzed by SmithKline Laboratory.ii The blood test
revealed that the woman had a blood alcohol level of .23, more than twice
the legal limit.' 2 The second blood test was taken a couple of hours after
the woman was admitted to Florida Medical Center.' 3 That blood sample
was evaluated by the hospital's laboratory and revealed that the woman had
a blood alcohol level of. 14. "
The driver properly disclosed his intentions to introduce these blood
alcohol tests in his pretrial exhibit list."S The doctor also disclosed his
intention to call the records custodians from the SmithKline Laboratory and
the Florida Medical Center to authenticate these documents under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule.' 6 Through a pretrial motion
in limine, the plaintiff sought to exclude this evidence on the grounds that
the doctor had failed to disclose any witnesses who could "lay a proper
predicate" to establish a chain of custody from the collection of the blood

5. Id.
6. Appellee's Answer Brief at 4, Love (No. 89-3259).
7. Id.
8. Initial Brief of Appellant at 1, Love (No. 89-3259).

9. Id.
10. Id.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, Love (No. 89-3259).

Id.
Id. at 1.
Id.at 6; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1991).
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sample through the testing procedure and creation of the document.'
Apparently, the trial court granted the motion in limine, excluding the test
results because the driver did not disclose witnesses who could establish this
chain of custody.'"
The case proceeded to trial and resulted in a jury verdict for the
plaintiff for two million dollars in damages, which was reduced to one
million dollars after finding each party to be fifty percent (50%) at fault.' 9
The doctor appealed the exclusion of the blood alcohol tests to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the exclusion.2" The case is
presently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.2'

A. Erosion of the Business Records Exception in Medical Records
Cases
The Florida Business Records Exception to the hearsay rule states:
90.803 Hearsay Exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. -

The provision of s. 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding, the
following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
(6) RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED BUSINESS
ACTIVITY.I (a)A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form,
of acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the sources
of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes a business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(b) No evidence in the form of an opinion or diagnosis is admissible
under paragraph (a) unless such opinion or diagnosis would be

17. Love, 611 So. 2d at 1272.
18. Id. at 1271.
19. Appellee's Answer Brief at I, Love (No. 89-3259).
20. Love, 611 So. 2d at 1270.
21. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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admissible under ss. 90.701-90.705 if the person whose opinion is
recorded were to testify to the opinion directly.22
When seeking to introduce documents pursuant to the Business Records
Exception, one typically solicits the testimony of the records custodian to
authenticate the document pursuant to the requirements of section 90.803(6).
However, the Love decision places a severe restraint upon a practitioner
seeking to introduce medical records through a records custodian.
The Love majority explained that the rationale behind the Business
Records Exception is the inherent trustworthiness of such documents.23
However, with regard to medical records, the court stated that such records
are inherently trustworthy only if the records were actually used by a
physician to aid in diagnosis or treatment of the patient.24 Thus, a party
seeking to introduce a particular medical document would necessarily have
to provide testimony of the treating physician, who would state that he
relied on the particular document sought to be introduced in his treatment
of the patient. Of course, there may be numerous routine documents in a
patient's medical file that are not directly relevant to the patient's particular
ailment and that may not necessarily be relied upon in the treatment of that
patient. Under Love, it would seem impossible to introduce routinely
prepared documents that were not relied upon for a patient's treatment since
they would not be inherently trustworthy. As the court stated, "[i]n a
medical records case, the trustworthiness element-the only basis for
business records admissibility- relates to whether the health care providers
relied on the test result in the course of treatment."25
In Love, the plaintiff's two blood tests indicated a blood alcohol level
in excess of the legal limit.26 The first blood test was ordered by the
police officer who accompanied the woman to the hospital, and that test was
examined by a laboratory outside of the hospital.27 The second blood test
was taken after the woman was admitted to the Florida Medical Center and
that test was evaluated by the hospital's laboratory several hours later. 8
However, after being hit by the doctor's car, the woman had massive
injuries requiring seven weeks of hospitalization, had six surgeries requiring

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

§ 90.803(6) (1991).
Love, 611 So. 2d at 1272.
Id at 1275.
Id.
See Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, Love (No. 89-3259).
Love, 611 So. 2d at 1275.
Id.
FLA. STAT.
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general anesthesia, and was required to wear a cast on her right leg for
almost two years.29 When this woman was admitted to the hospital, it may
not have been the emergency room physician's most immediate concern as
to whether the patient had an elevated blood alcohol level. Therefore, the
physician may not have relied upon that elevated blood alcohol level in
forming his or her diagnosis when rendering emergency treatment. The fact
that the doctor may not have relied upon that particular blood test should
not prohibit its introduction pursuant to section 90.803(6),3" but rather that
reliance or lack of reliance should be admissible on cross-examination to
attack the credibility of the report. 3'
In Love, there was apparently no physician to testify regarding his
reliance on the blood alcohol tests and, in the absence of such testimony, the
plaintiff's objection was that the defendant did not list any witnesses who
could document the chain of custody of the blood samples, the testing
procedures, and the test results. 32 There was apparently no other grounds
for objection established or set forth during the trial.33 Again, and as the
court noted, "gaps in the chain of custody or other uncertain circumstances
in the administration or interpretation of a test result are ordinarily thought
34
to go to the weight and credibility of the evidence, not its admissibility.
However, for blood alcohol tests, the court makes an exception to the
business records rule set forth in section 90.803(6) of the Florida Statutes.35 Keeping in mind that the objection in this case was to the "chain
of custbdy," the court rendered the following ruling:
[We] now hold that when medical record entries are sought to be
admitted under FEC [Florida Evidence Code] section 90.803(6), if
properly challenged by the opponent with a sufficient showing that
relates to the accuracy, reliability or trustworthiness of the entry, the
trial court may in its discretion decline to admit them unless the
proponent of the evidence lays the proper predicate for the entry. By
a proper predicate, we mean evidence as to the drawing of the blood,

29.
30.
31.
1962)).
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Appellee's Answer Brief at 4, Love (No. 89-3259).
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1991).
See Love, 611 So. 2d at 1276 (citing Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 361 (4th Cir.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id. at 1276 (citing Thomas, 308 F.2d at 361)).
Id.
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the chain of custody, the administration
of the test, and the interpreta36
tion and reporting of the test result.
Pursuant to this holding, in the absence of expert medical testimony,
when challenging the trustworthiness of the document, an opponent of the
medical record need only object to "chain of custody," or question the
testing procedure, or any other aspect of the method of formulating the
document sought to be introduced to place a severe hurdle in the path of the
proponent of the document. Thereafter, the proponent would be required to
produce the testimony of each person involved in the test procedure, from
the nurse or technician who drew the blood, to the person interpreting the
test. This is quite a heavy burden in light of the fact that section 90.803(6)
of the Florida Statutes merely requires the testimony of a records custodian. 37 Thus, at least in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the business
records exception has been severely limited in its application to the
introduction of medical record evidence.
B. Love's Impact on the Trial Lawyer
A trial lawyer who anticipates the entry of certain medical records must
prepare his; or her pre-trial case adequately, and must list properly each
person involved in the "chain of custody" in the pretrial witness list if the
attorney intends to introduce such documents. Of course, this will increase
the time and costs of preparation of a case involving medical records. If the
case is a contingency fee case, and if it is document-intensive, these added
requirements may affect an attorney's decision to take the case.
The case is currently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.3" As
of the date of this article, the Appellant's Initial Brief has been filed with
the Supreme Court of Florida.39

III.

MEETING THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT IN AUTOMOBILE
NEGLIGENCE CASES: THE EASKOLD DECISION

A. The Threshold Requirement
To recover damages for pain, suffering, or mental anguish arising from

36. Love, 611 So. 2d at 1276.
37. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1991).
38. See Love v. Garcia, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1993).

39. Love v. Garcia, No. 81478 (Fla. filed June 29, 1993).
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the negligent operation of an automobile, section 627.737(2) of the Florida
Statutes requires the plaintiff to prove that his or her pain, suffering, and
mental anguish is the result of permanent injury. n More specifically,
section 627.73 7(2) states that such damages are appropriate only in the event
that the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of:
(a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function;
(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement;
(c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement;
(d) Death.4'
The most common and controverted cases involve subsection (b), which
concerns permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. A determination of whether a party
has sustained permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical
probability requires a medical diagnosis and, therefore, medical expert
testimony in order to establish that such permanent injury does exist. Under
these circumstances, parties typically present a battle of the experts. In such
cases, it is no stretch of the imagination to understand that the jury is free
to render its verdict upon the expert testimony that it deems the most
credible. However, where the plaintiff establishes permanent injury within
a reasonable degree of medical probability through uncontradicted expert
testimony, may the jury disregard the expert testimony and find that the
plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold requirement? Surprisingly, the
answer may be yes.
B. The Easkold Decision
The Florida Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to consider this
issue in the case of Easkold v. Rhodes.42 Following an automobile
accident that occurred in July, 1988, the Rhodes' filed suit against Donna
Easkold seeking damages as a result of Easkold's negligent operation of her
automobile.43

The case was tried before a jury in 1990. 4 '

To establish

that she sustained a permanent injury as defined in section 627.737(2) of the

40. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (Supp. 1992).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. 614 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993).

43. Id. at 495.
44. Id. at 496.
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Florida Statutes, the plaintiff presented the depositions of three medical
experts.45
The first expert, an orthopedic surgeon, examined the plaintiff shortly
after the accident.46 He testified that the plaintiff had sustained permanent
injuries to her left knee, back, and neck and that such injuries were related
to the automobile accident, since the plaintiff denied having any pre-existing
injuries.4 7
The second medical expert performed an independent medical
examination ("IME") of the plaintiff.4' After taking a history from the
plaintiff, wherein she essentially denied any prior injuries, the doctor
performed an IME on Rhodes and testified that the plaintiff had sustained
permanent injuries to her neck, lower
back, and left knee as a result of the
49
July, 1988, automobile accident.
The third and final physician was the plaintiffs "regular physician."5
This doctor's medical chart revealed that on several occasions between 1975
and 1986, prior to the July, 1988 automobile accident, the plaintiff had been
examined by him for "various conditions, including numbness in her left leg
and toes, pain in her back, numbness and pain on the left side of her head
and neck, left leg pain, and pain in the ears and back."'"
The supreme court's opinion also indicates that the plaintiff had
admitted to being injured prior to the accident after being "hit in the leg
with a buffer," in the course of her employment.5 2 The defendant,
Easkold, presented no medical testimony to contradict that which was
presented by the plaintiff.53 Furthermore, the defendant did not establish
that the infbrmation concerning the plaintiff's pre-existing injuries would
have affected the physicians' medical opinions regarding the permanency of
the plaintiffs injuries.54
Following a jury trial, a verdict was rendered finding the defendant,
Easkold, negligent and awarding the plaintiff, Rhodes, $37,000 for medical
expenses, both past and future, and for loss of earning ability.55 The jury,
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 496.

48. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 496.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id. at 496.
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however, found that the plaintiff did not sustain permanent injuries as a
result of the July, 1988 accident and, therefore, awarded no damages for
pain and suffering.56 The verdict was reversed by the First District Court
of Appeal upon the authority of Morey v. Harper.57
In Morey, the First District Court of Appeal considered a similar factual
situation. 8 There, the plaintiff failed to disclose preexisting injuries to her
medical experts, who testified at trial that the plaintiff sustained permanent
injuries as a result of the accident. 59 The defendant presented no expert
medical testimony to contradict or rebut the plaintiffs evidence.6 ° Further,
neither of the plaintiff's experts testified that the undisclosed information
concerning preexisting injuries would have affected their opinion concerning
the plaintiffs permanent injuries.6 Thus, the court found that the expert's
opinions were materially uncontradicted. 62 The court, in reversing the
jury's verdict that the plaintiff did not sustain permanent injuries, reasoned
that since the determination as to what constitutes a permanent injury
necessarily requires expert medical testimony, the jury cannot disregard the
uncontradicted medical evidence.63
Without expressly overruling Morey, the Florida Supreme Court in
Easkold concluded that "the jury is free to 'accept or reject the testimony
of a medical expert just as it may accept or reject that of any other
expert. '" '6
However, the Easkold court also recognized that a jury's
discretion in disregarding uncontroverted expert testimony is limited, as
some basis for disregarding the evidence must appear in the record.65 The
court stated:
As we explained in Shaw, "even though the facts testified to by [the
medical expert] were not within the ordinary experience of the members
of the jury, the jury was still free to determine their credibility and to

56.
57.
1989).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
1964)).
65.

Id.
541 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 551 So. 2d 461 (Fla.
See id. at 1286.
Id. at 1286-87.
Id. at 1288.
Id.
Morey, 541 So. 2d at 1288.
Id.
Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 497 (quoting Shaw v. Puelo, 159 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla.
Id.
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decide: the weight to be ascribed to them in the face of conflicting lay
evidence."66
Thus, even though a plaintiff presents uncontradicted medical expert
testimony establishing the threshold required by section 627.737 of the
Florida Statutes, that testimony may not satisfy a jury that the plaintiff has
sustained a permanent injury.
In Easkold, the court held that the jury was "justified in determining
that the opinion testimony was flawed by reason of the materially untruthful
history given [to the doctors] by the claimant., 67 The court reached this
conclusion even though none of the medical experts testified that the
information they had not been provided would have affected their opinion. 68 Thus, the medical expert testimony was uncontroverted in this
case.

69

While the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Easkold may have
provided a just result, one can only ponder the potential effects that this
ruling may have on other cases in which a plaintiff fails to provide his
doctor with information concerning prior injuries thought to be unconnected
with the damages sought through the lawsuit. Under a strict interpretation
of the Easkold decision, it may be that a jury can disregard uncontroverted
medical testimony that the plaintiff's injury is permanent based solely upon
an omission in the plaintiff's history of injuries unconnected with those at
issue and without the defendant having to present medical testimony in
rebuttal.
C. Easkold's Impact Upon the Trial Lawyer
Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court decision in Easkold, it appears
that while it is not within the province of a lay person to determine whether
a party has sustained permanent injuries to a reasonable degree of medical
probability., a jury has considerable discretion in either accepting or rejecting
the required medical expert testimony.70 Therefore, apparently, it is no
longer necessary in all automobile negligence cases to have a "battle of
experts." If the defendant can establish some grounds from which a lay
person could conclude that the jury should not accept the expert testimony

66. Id. (quoting Shaw, 159 So. 2d at 644).
67. Id. at 498 (citing Rhodes v. Easkold, 588 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (Wolf, J., dissenting)).

68. Id.
69. Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 497.

70. Id. at 498.
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of a physician, whether or not those grounds would affect the physician's
opinion, then a jury verdict finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the
threshold requirement will be permitted to stand, notwithstanding the lack
of contradictory medical testimony.
In deciding whether to accept an automobile negligence case, in light
of the Easkold decision, the attorney should consider a review of the
potential client's medical records and should discuss those records with the
plaintiffs physicians prior to accepting the case.

IV. CONCLUSION
While 1993 has seen no significant modification to the Florida
Evidence Code, it as been a year of significant cases in the evidence arena.
In Love v. Garcia,7 the Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered an
opinion that significantly erodes the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, at least in cases which are medical records intensive. The
Love decision is one which both the plaintiff's lawyer, as well as the defense
attorney, will want to keep an eye on as it is currently on appeal to the
Florida Supreme Court.
In Easkold v. Rhodes,72 the Florida Supreme Court has given greater
deference to the jury in an auto negligence case in determining whether a
plaintiff has met the threshold requirement of permanent injury or scaring.
Easkold apparently stands for the proposition that a jury may accept or
reject the testimony of an expert witness, even though that expert's
testimony is uncontradicted and unrebutted, just as the jury may do with any
other witness.

71. 611 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla.
1993).
72. 614 So. 2d at 495.
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